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Abstract Prompted by the decisions of the CJEU in Svensson and GS Media, this
paper attempts to unmask the potential copyright liability of an internet user who
engages in hyperlinking, framing and/or inline linking from a principled and con-
ceptually coherent perspective. The overall discourse in this paper will be guided by
the following two questions:
1. Do these forms of online activity constitute acts of communication (or making
available) in the first instance?
2. Should they fall within the purview of Art. 3(1) of the EU Information Society
Directive and be subject to potential primary/direct liability (as opposed to
accessory/indirect liability)?
It is hoped that this paper will offer a rational view of the ongoing debate (and
provide sensible answers to these questions) by drawing on the established
jurisprudence of the courts in Europe, the UK and elsewhere, as well as by having
regard to the various interpretations of the concept of ‘‘publication’’ in the law of
defamation (in particular, Canadian law).
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1 Introduction
With copious amounts of information available, it can be quite daunting for online
users to navigate the internet without a reference tool to guide them. Hyperlinks (or
hypertext links) assume this very important role within the architecture of the World
Wide Web because, from a technical perspective, they are essentially HyperText
Markup Language (‘‘HTML’’) instructions that direct a user’s web browser to
another website (the ‘‘target website’’), another online document or another section
within the same website/document.1 Internet users are therefore transferred by
hyperlinks from one webpage to another almost instantaneously, regardless of
where the servers hosting these webpages may be located. Connecting webpages
(and the information they contain) through hyperlinks – which clearly reflects the
spirit of interconnectedness on the internet and which has now become a widely
accepted practice in the online environment – obviously allows users to locate and
access the information they desire far more efficiently than would otherwise be
possible.2 Unfortunately, some of these hyperlinks also lead internet users to target
websites on which copyright-infringing content (or other unauthorised material)
may be accessed, either through streaming, downloading or both.
It is appropriate, at this juncture, to introduce the various types of links that have
collectively shaped the World Wide Web as we know it today. They can broadly be
classified into four types: surface (or simple or shallow) links; deep links; framing
(or framed links); and inline links (or embedded links).
Surface links simply direct users from the linking website to the homepage of the
target website. Deep links, on the other hand, direct users from the linking website
to a deeper/inner page within the target website, thereby circumventing the
advertising business and revenue of the homepage in some instances. Both surface
and deep links require the user to click on the link provided – typically a Uniform
Resource Locator (‘‘URL’’) address – in order to be taken to the relevant content.
These user-activated links will generally be referred to in this paper as hyperlinks.
Whilst the effect of clicking on a surface or deep link is to transport a user from the
linking website to the target website (without any reference at all to the former), this is
not the case where framing is concerned. As its name suggests, an important feature
of framing is that the contents of the target website will be displayed within a frame
located on the linking website.3 As such, ‘‘the title of the page (above the toolbar) and
the address of the linking site (in the address box) are not replaced by the title and
address of the [target website]’’.4 The user who remains on the linking website may
1 Strowel and Hanley (2009), p. 72. For the avoidance of doubt, this paper is not concerned with links
that are themselves infringing in nature – e.g. links that contain a set of words that are collectively
protected by copyright (e.g. news headlines in Shetland Times Ltd v Dr Jonathan Wills [1997] FSR
p. 604) or links that are represented by a clickable ‘‘thumbnail’’ image which is protected by copyright
(see, e.g., Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp 77 F. Supp.2d p. 1116 (CD Cal 1999)).
2 Strowel and Ide (2001), p. 403 at p. 404. See also Collins (2010) at [5.42]: ‘‘Hyperlinks are the synapses
connecting different parts of the world wide web. Without hyperlinks, the web would be like a library
without a catalogue: full of information, but with no sure means of finding it’’.
3 Strowel and Ide (2001), p. 403 at pp. 407–408.
4 Strowel and Hanley (2009), p. 73.
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therefore not realise that he is actually viewing content that comes from another
source. Framing is often automatic in nature but can also be user-activated.
Similar to framing, inline links (or embedded links or inline linking) function in
the following way: whilst a user is still on the linking website, content from the
target website – such as an image/photo or a sound/video clip (having its own URL
address where that element is stored in digital form) – is automatically displayed on
or embedded within the linking website without the user having to click on any
visible link.5 Given the automatic character of such links, users are again given the
impression that they are viewing an element contained within (and stored on) the
linking website, when in actual fact that element emanates from the target website.6
Inline links help to save valuable digital space on the server hosting the linking
website because these embedded elements are not actually reproduced/stored on that
server at any point in time (but only temporarily on the user’s screen).7
As is also well known, Art. 3(1) of the EU Information Society Directive (the
‘‘InfoSoc Directive’’)8 implemented Art. 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 in EU
law. The WIPO Treaty introduced, for the first time, the broad (umbrella) right of
‘‘communication to the public’’ – which includes a distinct right of ‘‘making available
to the public’’.9 As the CJEU rightly pointed out in C More Entertainment AB v Linus
Sandberg,10 the right of making available to the public ‘‘forms part of’’ the ‘‘wider’’
concept of communication to the public.11 It is also generally accepted that the
making available right is intended to encompass interactive on-demand transmissions,
characterised by the fact that members of the public may access the relevant copyright
work(s) from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.12
The following two overarching questions will guide the overall discourse in this
paper:
1. Do these ubiquitous online practices (hyperlinking in general, framing and
inline linking) – which essentially provide users with on-demand access to
material located elsewhere on the internet – constitute acts of communication
(or making available) to begin with?
2. Should they fall within the purview of Art. 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive
(particularly where the material in question had been made freely available on
the internet without the consent of the copyright owner) and be subject to
potential primary/direct liability (as opposed to accessory/indirect liability)?
5 Strowel and Ide (2001), p. 403 at p. 408.
6 Ibid. See also Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn of
Internet Providers [2004] 2 SCR 427 at [25]; Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp 336 F.3d p. 811 at p. 816 (9th Cir.
2003); Perfect 10 Inc v Google Inc 508 F.3d p. 1146 at p. 1156 (9th Cir. 2007).
7 Strowel and Hanley (2009), p. 72.
8 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (the ‘‘InfoSoc
Directive’’) ([2001] OJ L 167/10). See also Recital 23.
9 For a historical introduction to the ‘‘making available’’ right, see Arezzo (2014) p. 524.
10 C More Entertainment AB v Linus Sandberg (Case C–279/13) EU:C:2015:199.
11 Ibid., at [24].
12 Ibid., at [26].
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Understandably, a ruling against all forms of linking in the copyright context will
clearly result in deleterious consequences for the World Wide Web.
According to the European Copyright Society (ECS),13 hyperlinking in general
should not be considered an act of communication (or making available) to the
public under Art. 3(1), but might in certain circumstances amount to (knowingly)
facilitating primary acts of copyright infringement (i.e. attracting accessory/indirect,
but not primary/direct, liability). The ECS has also argued that framing should not
be treated any differently from hyperlinking for copyright purposes.14
On the other hand, the Executive Committee of the Association Litteraire et
Artistique Internationale (ALAI) has taken the view that Art. 3(1) ‘‘covers links that
enable members of the public to access specific protected material’’, but not ‘‘links
that merely refer to a source from which a work may subsequently be accessed’’.15
In essence, deep links, inline links and framing should all infringe, but not surface
links.
Turning finally to the Association Internationale pour la Protection de la
Proprie´te´ Intellectuelle (AIPPI), the Executive Committee fairly recently adopted
the following Resolutions (amongst others):16
The act of placing a framed link or an embedded link should constitute a
communication to the public, at least when the manner in which the work has
been framed or embedded misleads the public into believing that the party
engaging in the framing or linking is the source of the work. [Resolution No.
5];
Linking to a copyrighted work which circumvents a technological restriction,
in particular but not limited to a technical protection measure, pay wall or a
password protection on a website, should attract liability under copyright law.
[Resolution No. 8].
Given the slew of views expressed above, quite where the line should be drawn in
light of the realities of modern day internet communications and the public interest
can no doubt be a matter of intense debate and differing perspectives. In this branch
of copyright law, clearly more than one view is possible and, at the end of the day,
there is perhaps no single correct answer.
Be that as it may, this paper will attempt to offer a rational view of the ongoing
debate (and hopefully provide sensible answers to the questions posed above) by
drawing on the established jurisprudence of the courts in Europe, the UK and
13 ‘‘Opinion on the Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson’’ (‘‘ECS Opinion’’) (15 February
2013). https://europeancopyrightsociety.org/opinion-on-the-reference-to-the-cjeu-in-case-c-46612-
svensson/ (accessed 20 November 2017). See, in particular, [6]–[7].
14 Ibid., at [53].
15 Report and Opinion ‘‘on the making available and communication to the public in the internet
environment – focus on linking techniques on the internet’’ (‘‘ALAI Report’’) (16 September 2013).
http://www.alai.org/en/assets/files/resolutions/making-available-right-report-opinion.pdf (accessed 20
November 2017). See, in particular, page 1 of the ‘‘Executive Summary’’ (emphasis in original).
16 Resolution on ‘‘Linking and making available on the Internet’’ (‘‘AIPPI Resolution’’) (20 September
2016). http://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Resolution-on-Linking-and-making-available-on-the-
Internet-English.pdf (accessed 20 November 2017).
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elsewhere, as well as by having regard to the various interpretations of the concept
of ‘‘publication’’ in the law of defamation (in particular, Canadian law). We begin
first with an analysis of CJEU jurisprudence.
2 A Critical Look at Relevant CJEU Jurisprudence
Undoubtedly, any discussion of copyright liability for hyperlinking must begin with
the CJEU’s seminal and well-known decision in Nils Svensson et al. v Retriever
Sverige AB (‘‘Svensson’’).17 The main issue in this reference for a preliminary ruling
was whether the provision of ‘‘clickable links’’ (deep links in this case) directing
internet users to copyright works on the target website amounted to a ‘‘commu-
nication to the public’’ within the meaning of Art. 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive.18
It should be mentioned at the outset that the analysis undertaken in this paper will
focus principally on the first element of the right of communication19 – namely,
whether the hyperlinker, via the act of hyperlinking, had himself engaged in an ‘‘act
of communication’’ (leaving aside the other criterion as to whether such
communication was ‘‘to the public’’).20
Reiterating the principle that the right of communication must be ‘‘construed
broadly’’,21 the CJEU in Svensson appears to have articulated a test for the existence
of an ‘‘act of communication’’ in the following terms: the hyperlinker must have
provided users of the linking website with ‘‘direct access’’ to copyright works on the
target website.22 Alternatively, a work is said to have been communicated if it is
‘‘made available to a public in such a way that the persons forming that public may
access it, irrespective of whether they avail themselves of that opportunity’’.23 If a
17 Nils Svensson et al v Retriever Sverige AB (‘‘Svensson’’) (Case C-466/12) EU:C:2014:76; [2014]
WLR(D) p. 67; [2014] 3 CMLR p. 4; [2014] ECDR p. 9; [2014] Bus LR p. 259; [2015] EMLR p. 5. The
detailed facts are set out in the judgment at [8] et seq.
18 Svensson at [13].
19 It is trite law that the concept of ‘‘communication to the public’’ includes two cumulative criteria,
namely an ‘‘act of communication’’ of a copyright work and the communication of that work to a
‘‘public’’: Svensson at [16].
20 For further commentary on – and critique of – the ‘‘to the public’’/‘‘new public’’ criterion, see
Ginsburg (2014); Gothy (2015); Strowel and Ide (2001), p. 403 (especially at pp. 412–415); Hugenholtz
and van Velze (2016), p. 797; Karapapa (2017), p. 63; Bently and Sherman (2014), p. 169. One
commentator has labelled the ‘‘new public’’ criterion ‘‘an (at best) enigmatic concept’’: Dinwoodie
(2017), p. 12. Additionally, some commentators have suggested that the ‘‘implied licence’’ theory can
better explain and justify the ‘‘new public’’ criterion, while others have argued that it may actually be in
conflict with international treaties (such as the Berne Convention and the WIPO Copyright Treaty) as well
as the InfoSoc Directive.
21 Svensson at [17].
22 Svensson at [18] and [30]. This test has been endorsed (in various forms) in subsequent cases before
the CJEU: see BestWater International GmbH v Michael Mebes et al (Case C-348/13) EU:C:2014:2315 at
[15]; GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV et al (‘‘GS Media’’) (Case C-160/15)
EU:C:2016:644 at [43]; Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems (Case C-527/15) EU:C:2017:300 at
[37]; Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV et al (Case C-610/15) EU:C:2017:456 at [34].
23 Svensson at [19] (emphasis added) – endorsed again, more recently, in Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik
Wullems (Case C-527/15) EU:C:2017:300 at [36].
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hyperlinker satisfies this test (of providing users with direct access or of users
themselves being able to obtain access), then arguably there is an act of
communication (or making available) on his part for which he may be found
primarily/directly liable for copyright infringement (subject of course to such
communication being made ‘‘to the public’’).
At this juncture, it is appropriate to pause and consider whether the test of
‘‘access’’ thus postulated by the CJEU can be criticised for being much too broad
and uncertain in scope. As a preliminary matter, it is somewhat surprising for the
CJEU to suggest that the hyperlinker, in supplying the relevant hyperlink, had
provided internet users with ‘‘direct access’’ to copyright works on the target
website. The party who had granted ‘‘direct access’’ to these works in the first
instance must surely be the owner of the target website – the person who has
absolute autonomy and control over the (unauthorised) works uploaded on his
website. Internet users can always obtain their own access to unauthorised material
by visiting the target website directly without having to rely on the hyperlink.24
Accordingly, the party who ought to assume primary/direct liability for the
unauthorised communication to the public of copyright-protected works must
logically be the owner of the target website (i.e. the uploader of unauthorised
material), a point to which we shall return in greater detail below.
As to the other formulation of the test (of users being able to obtain access),
consider the following scenario. Let us assume that A provides a link on his website
to B’s website which, in turn, provides a link to unauthorised material on the target
website. Who, in this example, has provided internet users with ‘‘direct access’’ to
such material? Applying the CJEU’s test of ‘‘direct access’’, the answer must be B
(the primary/direct infringer). But why not A as well – did he not also provide users
with ‘‘access’’ of some sort?
More pertinently, is A’s conduct (and indeed intent) any different from B’s?
Applying the alternative formulation of the test for the existence of an ‘‘act of
communication’’, is it not true that ultimately, internet users can still obtain access
to unauthorised material on the target website through the use of either hyperlink
(which gives access)? Indeed, this must be so regardless of the number of
intermediaries there are in the hyperlinking chain because it would otherwise seem
absurd for the law of copyright to treat A and B (and C and so on) any differently.
However, this line of argument would then lead to the equally absurd consequence
that primary/direct copyright liability may well arise in relation to all hyperlinkers
in the chain, regardless of how far removed any one of them is from the source
website. Is this view of copyright law – that the right of communication (or making
available) is no more than a pure ‘‘access’’ right – defensible?
Clearly, there are difficulties with the CJEU’s test for the existence of an ‘‘act of
communication’’ in both its formulations – i.e. providing users with (direct) access
to, or users being given the opportunity to access, unauthorised material. In fact, the
‘‘intervention to give access’’ test has been described to be ‘‘much too broad’’ and
‘‘untenable’’, because ‘‘if communication really is that broad, then lending libraries,
video rentals, bookshops (which permit browsing), retailers who have works of
24 See also Strowel and Ide (2001), p. 403 at p. 425.
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applied art on display, and even art galleries are involved in communicating to the
public’’.25 This is also a point to which we shall return in greater detail below.
There is, however, a silver lining in the Svensson decision. At paragraph 31 of the
judgment, the CJEU opined thus:
where a clickable link makes it possible for users of the site on which that link
appears to circumvent restrictions put in place by the site on which the
protected work appears in order to restrict public access to that work to the
latter site’s subscribers only, and the link accordingly constitutes an
intervention without which those users would not be able to access the works
transmitted, all those users must be deemed to be a new public, which was not
taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised the initial
communication, and accordingly the holders’ authorisation is required for
such a communication to the public.26
Although the CJEU was specifically addressing the ‘‘new public’’ criterion in the
paragraph cited above,27 the court’s dicta might, serendipitously, point us to yet
another formulation of the test for an ‘‘act of communication’’ which is far more
circumscribed and (in this author’s view) tenable. In other words, instead of framing
its arguments and reasoning from the perspective of the ‘‘new public’’ criterion, the
CJEU in Svensson could have taken the opportunity to clarify that an act of
communication (or making available) only occurs when the defendant has
intervened in such a manner that users would otherwise not be able to obtain
access to unauthorised material on the target website but for the defendant’s
deliberate intervention (the ‘‘but for’’ test). This, it is submitted, would have been
the preferable approach.
How then can we apply the ‘‘but for’’ test in context? One classic example of the
application of the ‘‘but for’’ test may be gleaned from the very paragraph cited
above.28 Where a given hyperlink does indeed provide ‘‘direct access’’ to
unauthorised material owing to its circumvention effect,29 the hyperlinker can be
taken to have engaged in an act of communication (or making available) because he
has intervened in such a way that online users would otherwise not be able to access
such material on the target website but for his deliberate intervention.30
As mentioned, this was not how the CJEU in Svensson approached the matter.
Instead, the Court took the view that ‘‘the provision of clickable links [without
distinguishing between the various types of links and quaere automatically triggered
links] to protected works must be considered to be ‘making available’ and,
25 Bently and Sherman (2014), pp. 162–163 (citation omitted).
26 Emphasis added.
27 For the avoidance of doubt, the CJEU’s analysis at [31] was concerned with the question whether there
had been a communication to a ‘‘new public’’, rather than whether there had been an ‘‘act of
communication’’ in the first instance within the meaning of Art. 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive.
28 Svensson at [31].
29 In allowing users to by-pass technological protection measures put in place by the copyright owner,
such as paywalls and other subscription-based services. Cf. Resolution No. 8 of the AIPPI Resolution.
30 Cf. Hugenholtz and van Velze (2016), p. 797 (in particular, the ‘‘Conclusion’’ section).
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therefore, an ‘act of communication’, within the meaning of [Art. 3(1)]’’.31 The
conclusion that was ultimately reached, however, was that the provision of deep
links by the defendant to works freely available on the target website did not
constitute a communication (or making available) ‘‘to the public’’ because there was
no ‘‘new public’’ on the facts of the case.32
It is therefore clear from the Svensson decision that the mere provision of
‘‘clickable links’’ (which circumvent access restrictions applied by the target
website or otherwise) will amount to an act of communication (or making available)
within the meaning of Art. 3(1). However, in a somewhat contrived fashion, the
CJEU nevertheless managed to safeguard the architecture and smooth functioning
of the internet – by preserving the legitimacy of hyperlinking under certain limited
circumstances – through the ‘‘new public’’ criterion articulated in the following
terms:33
in order to be covered by the concept of ‘‘communication to the public’’…, a
communication … concerning the same works as those covered by the initial
communication and made, as in the case of the initial communication, on the
internet, and therefore by the same technical means, must also be directed at a
new public, that is to say, at a public that was not taken into account by the
copyright holders when they authorised the initial communication to the
public.
In other words, the ‘‘new public’’ criterion will not be satisfied if: (1) the
hyperlinker has employed the same technical means as those employed by the
copyright owner to offer access to the copyright work (e.g. in Svensson, the
technical means of communication were identical – both involving communications
on the internet); and (2) the target audience of the communication effected through
the hyperlink is the same as the target audience of the initial communication
effected by the copyright owner (i.e. the conditions of access, if any, must be the
same for both sets of communication). It was precisely the ‘‘new public’’ criterion
(rather, a lack thereof on the facts) that enabled the CJEU in Svensson to reject
copyright liability on the part of the defendant hyperlinker.
The next CJEU case of relevance to our discussion was one that concerned the
act of framing (or ‘‘transclusion’’). In BestWater International GmbH v Michael
Mebes et al.,34 the defendant used the framing technique to insert into his webpage a
copyright work obtained from the target website which had already been made
freely available to the public (specifically, on YouTube). It is fair to suggest that if
the CJEU in Svensson had taken the view that the act of deep linking (on the facts of
that case) did amount to an act of communication (or making available),35 then a
31 Svensson at [20] (emphasis added).
32 Svensson at [25]–[28].
33 Svensson at [24], and endorsed again in GS Media at [37].
34 BestWater International GmbH v Michael Mebes et al (‘‘BestWater’’) (Case C-348/13)
EU:C:2014:2315. This is an unpublished decision in the German and French languages only.
35 Svensson at [20].
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fortiori, the act of framing must also constitute the same. We shall, however, return
to this proposition in greater detail below.
Ultimately, and unsurprisingly, the court in BestWater decided that there was no
breach of the right of communication to the public because the copyright work in
question (which was freely available on YouTube) was not communicated to a
‘‘new public’’ nor was it communicated using a specific technical method different
from that of the original communication.36 It is apposite to point out, at this
juncture, that neither in Svensson nor in BestWater did the CJEU have to consider
whether primary/direct liability can arise where the hyperlink in question directs
users to a copyright work on the target website (or where the framing website
embeds such a work) – though freely accessible by the public – which had been
uploaded without the consent of the copyright owner.37
The CJEU finally had the opportunity to address this very question in the high-
water-mark case of GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV et al. (‘‘GS
Media’’).38 This was a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of
the Netherlands and involved hyperlinking to a target website which contained
material, though freely accessible by the public, that had been made available
without the consent of the copyright owner.
Advocate General (AG) Melchior Wathelet’s Opinion,39 with which this author
respectfully agrees, may be summarised thus:
1. The AG opined that hyperlinking should not fall within the ambit of Art. 3(1)
because ‘‘hyperlinks which lead, even directly, to protected works do not ‘make
available’ those works to a public where the works are already freely accessible
on another website, but merely facilitate the finding of those works’’.40 Instead,
the AG agreed with the observation made by the Portuguese Republic that ‘‘the
act which constitutes the actual ‘making available’ was the action by the person
who effected the initial communication [i.e. the owner of the target website]’’.41
2. In order to establish an ‘‘act of communication’’, ‘‘the intervention of the
‘hyperlinker’ must be vital or indispensable in order to benefit from or enjoy
works’’.42
3. In the AG’s view, ‘‘the criterion that an intervention must be indispensable can
be approached only in examining the existence of an act of communication
36 BestWater at [15]–[18].
37 GS Media at [43]. Svensson and BestWater appear to have settled the question that there is no breach
of the right of communication to the public where the hyperlink leads users to material that is freely
available on the target website with the consent of the copyright owner: see GS Media at [40]–[42].
38 GS Media (Case C-160/15) EU:C:2016:644; [2017] 1 CMLR p. 30. For a comment on this decision,
see Eleonora Rosati, ‘‘GS Media and its Implications for the Construction of the Right of Communication
to the Public within EU Copyright Architecture’’ (2017) 54(4) Common Market Law Review p. 1221.
39 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV et al (‘‘GS Media (Opinion)’’) (Case C-160/15)
EU:C:2016:221.
40 GS Media (Opinion) at [54] (emphasis in original).
41 Ibid.
42 GS Media (Opinion) at [57]. It is submitted that the AG’s view – of an intervention which ‘‘must be
vital or indispensable’’ – accords with the ‘‘but for’’ test proposed by this author earlier (see the text
accompanying note 27, above).
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[because] [i]t is at that point that there is possibly a ‘making available’ within
the meaning of Article 3(1)’’.43
The AG finally came to the conclusion that the mere provision of hyperlinks in
this case did not result in an ‘‘act of communication’’ within the meaning of Art.
3(1) because the intervention of the hyperlinker was ‘‘not indispensable’’ to the
making available of the relevant copyright works to the public.44 Further
underscoring the AG’s views is the fact that this Opinion was driven largely by
policy considerations underlying the proper functioning and the very architecture of
the internet, in particular the social benefits of hyperlinking in the overall
development of the information society. A conclusion to the contrary would
therefore have undermined one of the principal objectives of the InfoSoc Directive.
The CJEU, in its judgment, acknowledged (as did the AG) the ‘‘indispensable’’
role played by the communicator and the ‘‘deliberate’’ nature of his intervention.45
The Court then laid down the following test for determining when an ‘‘act of
communication’’ occurs – when the defendant intervenes, in full knowledge of the
consequences of his action, to provide users with access to a copyright work (the
‘‘intervention to give access’’ test); and this is particularly the case where, in the
absence of that intervention, internet users would not, in principle, be able to enjoy
the copyright work in question.46
On one view, the ‘‘intervention to give access’’ test in GS Media may be regarded
as a plain restatement of the Svensson test – i.e. of providing users with (direct) access
or of users being given the opportunity to gain access. This interpretation of an ‘‘act of
communication’’ has already been criticised earlier in this paper for being much too
broad and uncertain in scope. Another perspective of the GS Media test is that the
CJEU had taken one step further (than in Svensson) in providing us with a specific
(albeit non-exhaustive) example of when an act of communication (or making
available) may arise – namely, when the defendant has intervened in such a manner
that users would otherwise not be able to obtain access to the copyright work but for
the defendant’s deliberate intervention. It will be recalled that this particular example
supplied by the CJEU in GS Media mirrors precisely the ‘‘but for’’ test – proposed by
this author above – for determining when an act of communication (or making
available) may be established. And although this particular example was also featured
in the CJEU’s analysis in Svensson,47 it was raised solely in the context of discussing
the ‘‘new public’’ criterion. Be that as it may, insofar as hyperlinking is concerned, the
CJEU in Svensson had already decided, categorically, that ‘‘the provision of clickable
links to protected works must be considered to be ‘making available’ and, therefore,
an ‘act of communication’’’.48 Curiously, the CJEU did not cite or comment on this
particular finding in its judgment in GS Media.
43 GS Media (Opinion) at [59] (emphasis added).
44 GS Media (Opinion) at [60].
45 GS Media at [35].
46 Ibid. Curiously, the CJEU in GS Media did not cite the Svensson decision in this regard, nor address its
various formulations of the test of ‘‘access’’.
47 Svensson at [31].
48 Svensson at [20] (emphasis added).
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Nevertheless, it is submitted that, on the whole, the CJEU in GS Media could still
have re-crafted the test for the existence of an ‘‘act of communication’’ by making it
more watertight. In particular, the Court could have stipulated that the ‘‘but for’’ test
must be satisfied on the facts before an act of communication (or making available)
can be established. As compared to the ‘‘intervention to give access’’ test (which
ought to have been judicially jettisoned), this ‘‘but for’’ approach not only gives full
effect to the ‘‘indispensable’’ role played by the communicator, it also accords with
objectivity and fairness and, above all, provides greater certainty to all members of
the online community who routinely engage in hyperlinking.49
The reservations expressed by this author above – as regards the very amorphous
and unsatisfactory ‘‘intervention to give access’’ test – could well have played on the
minds of the learned judges in GS Media, perhaps subconsciously. This is because,
instead of relying on the ‘‘new public’’ criterion to safeguard the architecture and
smooth functioning of the internet (as did the CJEU in Svensson),50 the Court in GS
Media decided to adopt yet another approach (an absolutely novel one at that!) to
regulate the potential copyright liability of a defendant hyperlinker.
Where the posting of a hyperlink was carried out without a profit motive, the
CJEU found it relevant to consider whether the hyperlinker possessed actual or
constructive knowledge that the hyperlink would direct users to material which had
been made freely available on the target website without the consent of the
copyright owner.51 On the other hand, where the posting of hyperlinks was carried
out for profit, a rebuttable presumption will arise (so declared the CJEU) that the
hyperlinker possessed actual knowledge of the same.52 Therefore, if a not-for-profit
hyperlinker does indeed possess actual or constructive knowledge and if a for-profit
hyperlinker is unable to rebut the presumption of actual knowledge, then primary/
direct copyright liability – for the breach of the right of communication to the public
– will flow accordingly.
Some personal observations are apposite at this juncture. Curiously, why does the
CJEU consider the ‘‘profit-making nature’’ of the activity to be relevant in the
overall assessment (or in the raising of a rebuttable presumption) of primary/direct
liability for hyperlinking? Bearing in mind that unauthorised hyperlinking may
49 Cf. Midelieva (2017), p. 479 at p. 482 and p. 486.
50 The various difficulties with using the ‘‘new public’’ criterion (or the affiliated concept of ‘‘consent’’
on the part of the copyright owner) as a control mechanism in the overall determination of copyright
liability for hyperlinking were duly acknowledged by the CJEU at [22] and [46] of its judgment in GS
Media.
51 GS Media at [47]. It has been observed that this knowledge requirement ‘‘seems to effectively
establish a notice and takedown system under the head of primary liability’’: Leistner (2017) p. 327 at
p. 329. See also GS Media at [53].
52 GS Media at [51]. It is not immediately apparent why a for-profit hyperlinker should be ‘‘expected’’ to
carry out ‘‘the necessary checks’’ on the copyright status of the material to which the hyperlink leads. Is
there a general duty imposed on him by the law of copyright to conduct due diligence searches prior to the
posting of hyperlinks and if so, what form of checks (and their extent thereof) would be ‘‘expected’’ of the
hyperlinker? Further, what does ‘‘for profit’’ (or ‘‘pursuit of financial gain’’) mean – would this include all
operators of commercial websites? Arguably, a vast majority of publicly accessible websites containing
hyperlinks can be deemed ‘‘for profit’’ websites. It is a shame that the CJEU did not attempt to clarify the
boundaries of this element.
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result in the infringement of what is essentially a strict liability tort (namely, a
breach of the right of communication to the public), has the CJEU unwittingly
conflated primary/direct liability principles with the appropriate factors that a court
may consider at the point when the defendant pleads the fair use/dealing defence to
copyright liability (one of which concerns ‘‘the purpose and character of the use/
dealing, including whether such use/dealing is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes’’)?53
Further, by introducing the knowledge requirement on the part of the hyperlinker
in both for-profit and not-for-profit scenarios, the GS Media decision has caused
greater confusion and uncertainty in the law as the CJEU appears to have again
conflated the distinct concepts of primary/direct liability on the one hand and
accessory/indirect liability on the other.54 As is conventional wisdom, the breach of
a copyright owner’s exclusive right(s) – such as the right of communication to the
public – gives rise to a strict liability tort. The state of mind/motives of, and
knowledge possessed by, the alleged infringer ought to be of no relevance at all in
the court’s assessment of primary/direct liability.55
If knowledge were indeed a relevant consideration in this regard, would it be
tenable (for example) for the owner of the target website to plead non-infringement
as well because, in uploading material on his website (without a profit motive), he
did not possess actual or constructive knowledge that such material had been made
freely available by him without the consent of the copyright owner? For the
purposes of ascribing liability, can we rationally distinguish the culpability of the
uploader of infringing material in this instance from that of the hyperlinker, both of
whom have been alleged to have infringed the same exclusive right? With respect,
the CJEU’s take on the question of knowledge on the part of the defendant
hyperlinker will no doubt lead to many other problematic consequences.
For the sake of doctrinal clarity, it will again be explained below that copyright
liability for hyperlinking ought to be examined through the lens of accessory/
indirect liability (or liability which is derivative in nature), rather than primary/
direct liability which is strict.56 This is where it will be incumbent on the trial judge
– in the course of determining liability – to inquire into the motives of (and
knowledge possessed by) the alleged infringer. It is unfortunate that the GS Media
decision has given rise to numerous doctrinal challenges, although ironically, all
53 See, e.g., Sec. 107 of the US Copyright Act 1976 (17 USC §107) and Sec. 35(2)(a) of the Singapore
Copyright Act 1987 (emphasis added).
54 Accessory/indirect liability should be interpreted broadly to include other associated legal concepts,
such as contributory liability and authorisation liability. In these areas of the law outside of primary/direct
liability, the knowledge possessed by the alleged infringer (or lack thereof) is of utmost relevance in
ascertaining liability. For instance, a hyperlinker – in the absence of actual knowledge – may nevertheless
be imputed with constructive knowledge of the occurrence of copyright infringement because he ought to
have carried out ‘‘the necessary checks’’ to determine whether the target website to which the hyperlink
leads was hosting copyright-infringing material.
55 See also Clark and Dickenson (2017), p. 265 at p. 269 (‘‘In doing so the CJEU in GS Media removes
primary copyright infringement – at least within the context of hyperlinking – from the ambit of strict
liability, a concept which is not foreseen in the InfoSoc Directive.’’).
56 For a commentary that argues in favour of a theory of indirect infringement to better deal with
hyperlinking scenarios, see Schellekens (2016), p. 401 at pp. 405–407.
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these challenges could well have arisen because of the CJEU’s own mindfulness in
adopting a quasi human rights approach to balancing the various competing
interests in relation to the practice of hyperlinking on the internet.57
Brief mention will now be made of the recent CJEU decision in Stichting Brein v
Ziggo BV et al. (‘‘Ziggo’’).58 Although this case did not involve hyperlinking as
such, it is nevertheless instructive in illustrating how the right of communication to
the public in Art. 3(1) – as presently construed by the CJEU – can be used to
regulate not just hyperlinking activity on the internet, but also other forms of online
intervention that provide users with unauthorised access to copyright material.
Ziggo was a case that involved the operators of The Pirate Bay (TPB), which
made available to users an indexing and file-sharing platform on which large
quantities of copyright-infringing material may be located, freely accessed and
shared in the context of a peer-to-peer network. The plaintiff copyright foundation
sought an order from the Dutch courts to compel the defendant internet access
providers to block the domain names and Internet Protocol addresses of TPB so as
to prevent the services of these providers from being used to infringe copyright. The
principal question that was referred by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands to the
CJEU for a preliminary ruling was whether TPB itself had breached the right of
communication to the public through the operation of its online file-sharing
platform.
From the operational set-up and architecture of the file-sharing system, it was
clear that TPB played an instrumental role – or, in the words of the CJEU, an
‘‘indispensable’’59 or ‘‘essential’’60 role – in enabling its users to obtain (direct)
access to vast amounts of copyright-infringing content. Irrefutably, the operator of
TPB had intervened, in full knowledge of the consequences of its action, to provide
its users with access to unauthorised material, clearly satisfying the ‘‘intervention to
give access’’ test. Applying the stricter ‘‘but for’’ test proposed by this author, it may
also be forcefully argued that online users would otherwise not be able to obtain
access to these works – or would only be able to do so with immense difficulty – but
for TPB’s deliberate intervention.61 This is because there is unlikely to be any one
source (other than TPB’s BitTorrent protocol) to which internet users can turn to
obtain access and therefore, from their perspective, the TPB platform does, in a real
(‘‘but for’’) sense, make available the unauthorised content to them in breach of
copyright.62
57 See GS Media at [31] and [45].
58 Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV et al (‘‘Ziggo’’) (Case C-610/15) EU:C:2017:456.
59 Ziggo at [26].
60 Ziggo at [37].
61 Ziggo at [36].
62 For an English case that reached a similar outcome, see Arnold J’s decision in EMI Records Ltd v
British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch) (especially at [45]–[46]).
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3 Linking on the Internet and Copyright Liability
As mentioned in the Introduction above, an important objective of this paper is to
seek rational answers to the following two questions:
1. Do these forms of online activity – hyperlinking in general, framing and inline
linking – constitute acts of communication (or making available) in the first
instance?
2. Should they fall within the purview of Art. 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive and be
subject to potential primary/direct liability – as opposed to accessory/indirect
liability – for the breach of the right of communication (or making available) to
the public?
3.1 Hyperlinking in General
Insofar as hyperlinking is concerned, the CJEU in Svensson, having articulated the
‘‘intervention to give access’’ test, summarily expressed the view that the mere
‘‘provision of clickable links to protected works must be considered to be ‘making
available’ and, therefore, an ‘act of communication’’’.63 Subject to satisfying the ‘‘new
public’’ criterion, a hyperlinker under such circumstances would have been found
primarily liable in copyright for the breach of the right of communication (or making
available) to the public. This author respectfully disagrees, as have other commen-
tators.64 Crucially, does a hyperlink provide internet users with ‘‘direct access’’, or the
opportunity to gain access, to unauthorised material on the target website?
Clearly, the owner of the target website (on the assumption that he is also the initial
uploader of the unauthorised material in question) is in every instance the primary
actor, without whose intervention an infringing copy of the copyright work would not
have found its way to the portals of the internet. He must therefore be regarded in law
as the primary/direct infringer – i.e. the party who first provided the online community
with direct, on-demand access to that particular infringing copy.65
The hyperlinker, however, is at least one step removed from this process. What a
hyperlink does, in essence, is to direct users (and facilitate users’ access) to another
location on the internet. It is simply a very convenient tool that provides a pathway
for users to access information and other online material that have already been
made available elsewhere on the internet. A hyperlink merely serves as a secondary
point of access and provides indirect access at best.66
63 Svensson at [20] (emphasis added).
64 See, e.g., Bently and Sherman (2014), pp. 169–170: ‘‘we think that the Court of Justice would be wise
to revisit its assumption that the creation of a hyperlink is a making available (or communication) of a
work at all’’.
65 Indeed, online users can still obtain their own access to the infringing work in question –
independently of the hyperlink – by visiting the target website directly. Cf. also AG Wathelet’s views in
GS Media (Opinion) at [54]. See, further, Crookes v Newton [2011] 3 SCR 269 at [29] and [41].
66 Take, for example, the analogy of a library. A particular book (like a work uploaded on the target
website) is either available or it is not. Just because the library also provides a catalogue (cf. hyperlink)
which makes the book more accessible to a user does not change the fact that the book already exists in
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Compelling arguments have been raised that hyperlinks function in a manner akin
to the roles played by directional signs,67 bibliographic footnotes/citations and library
catalogues. For example, the Copyright Board of Canada has opined that hyperlinks
‘‘represent an electronic directory of addresses’’.68 In his ‘‘Commentary on Web
Architecture’’, Sir Tim Berners-Lee (a man widely credited as the inventor of the
World Wide Web)69 was of the view thus: ‘‘The intention in the design of the web
was that normal links should simply be references, with no implied meaning’’.70
It has also been argued that hyperlinks are the electronic equivalent of
bibliographic footnotes/citations in a document,71 which only inform the reader of
(but typically assume no responsibility for) the source from which the quotation/
authority is taken – i.e. a pure reference tool or ‘‘location tool’’.72 It would indeed be
ludicrous to suggest that the author of the document has provided access to (or made
available) the source in question just by the insertion of footnotes per se. Logically,
it is the reader who must still avail himself of (or gain his own access to) the
relevant material, for example by visiting a library or consulting a database (both of
which provide access). Similarly, using a hyperlink to access online material is akin
to using a library’s catalogue or card index to gain access to specific bibliographic
items within the library far more quickly and efficiently.73 Surely, it is the library
that provides its users with access and not the catalogue or card index per se.74
Footnote 66 continued
the library and is available to all library users. Even if there were no catalogue on hand, that book still
exists regardless, although it will be much harder to locate. See also the CJEU’s own dicta in GS Media at
[48]. See, further, Strowel and Ide (2001), p. 403 at p. 425: ‘‘[A]s the work is already available to the
entire internet community at the linked site’s web address, we cannot be dealing with a new act of making
it available to the public. The link does not extend the work’s audience: surfers who access the work by
activating the link can also consult the page directly (as long as they know its URL). Concluding that
there is a new communication to the public does not seem justified (and would cause considerable
difficulties in terms of copyright management)’’.
67 Pearson Educ Inc v Ishayev 963 F. Supp.2d p. 239 at pp. 250–251 (SDNY 2013).
68 Tariff 22, Copyright Board of Canada (1999) 1 CPR (4th) 417 (27 October 1999). This case was
eventually heard by the Supreme Court of Canada: see Society of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn of Internet Providers [2004] 2 SCR 427. See also Perfect 10 Inc v
Google Inc 508 F.3d p. 1146 at p. 1161 (9th Cir. 2007).
69 See the World Wide Web Foundation website at http://webfoundation.org/about/sir-tim-berners-lee/
(accessed 20 November 2017).
70 Berners-Lee (1997).
71 The footnote argument was raised by the Portuguese Republic in its written observations to the CJEU
in the GS Media case: see GS Media (Opinion) at [23]–[24]. See also Crookes v Newton (2009) 311 DLR
(4th) 647 (British Columbia Court of Appeal) at [89].
72 Bently and Sherman (2014), pp. 164 and 170.
73 See Ticketmaster Corp v Tickets.Com Inc 54 USPQ2d p. 1344 (CD Cal 2000); Crookes v Newton
(2009) 311 DLR (4th) 647 (British Columbia Court of Appeal) at [89].
74 Cf. Eady J’s illuminating dicta in Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corp
[2009] EWHC 1765 (QB); [2010] 3 All ER p. 548 at [52]: ‘‘an analogy may be drawn perhaps with a
search carried out in a large conventional library. If a scholar wishes to check for references to his
research topic, he may well consult the library catalogue. On doing so, he may find that there are some
potentially relevant books in one of the bays and make his way there to see whether he can make use of
the content. It is hardly realistic to attribute responsibility for the content of those books to the
compiler(s) of the catalogue’’.
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Consider also the following argument from the perspective of ‘‘control’’. To what
extent is a hyperlinker’s potential liability in copyright implicated when the owner
of the target website (the initial uploader and primary actor) decides to remove the
infringing work from the internet or to otherwise alter the contents of the target
website from non-infringing to copyright-infringing? Typically, a hyperlinker does
not possess any control at all over the source material, as to which he is alleged to
have made available to the public. Whether the hyperlink does in fact provide access
to (and make available) material on the target website depends entirely on the
continued availability – and, in some cases, legitimacy – of the source material.75
Clearly, it is the owner of the target website who has complete autonomy and
editorial control. Under such circumstances, is it still arguable that the hyperlinker
ought to assume primary/direct liability (for making available the targeted material)
on the basis of an activity that is entirely dependent on contingencies which are
beyond his control?
This is perhaps where it may be helpful to clearly distinguish the term ‘‘access’’
from the notion of ‘‘making available’’. In short, ‘‘accessibility’’ does not
necessarily mean ‘‘availability’’ under the InfoSoc Directive. This is because whilst
every instance of making available constitutes an act of providing access, it must be
borne in mind that not every intervention which purports to provide/facilitate access
amounts to an act of making available. This distinction is important in ensuring that
the ‘‘making available’’ right is not conveniently labelled a pure ‘‘access’’ right.76 It
is submitted that this proposition must be correct, particularly when we consider the
following argument which flows from our earlier discussion. A hyperlink clearly
facilitates access to, but does not always make available, material on the target
website in cases where the material to which the hyperlink originally led is now no
longer available on the target website or has since changed in form and substance.
For all these reasons, it ought to be clear that the hyperlinker – unlike the owner
of the target website – is not the primary actor in his own right and should therefore
not be regarded in law as a primary/direct infringer who is in breach of the right of
communication (or making available) to the public.
However, this does not mean that the hyperlinker is completely absolved of all
liability in every instance. It will be recalled that in the GS Media decision, the
CJEU had adopted the view that knowledge on the part of the hyperlinker is now a
relevant consideration in the overall determination of copyright liability. This
particular aspect of the Court’s judgment – in bringing the mental element into the
fray when the legal issue at hand is essentially one of strict liability – has already
been critiqued above for its lack of doctrinal coherence.
75 See, e.g., the dicta of the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) in Paperboy, Case I ZR
259/00 [2005] ECDR (7) p. 67 at [42]: ‘‘If the web page containing the protected work is deleted after the
setting of the hyperlink, the hyperlink misses’’. See also the CJEU’s own admission in GS Media at [46]:
‘‘Moreover, the content of a website to which a hyperlink enables access may be changed after the
creation of that link, including the protected works, without the person who created that link necessarily
being aware of it’’. See, further, Crookes v Newton [2011] 3 SCR 269 at [27]. Crucially, does a
hyperlinker (who supplied the link to the target website prior to these subsequent developments) have a
continuing duty to monitor the legitimacy of the material to which the hyperlink leads or be otherwise
subject to potential primary/direct copyright liability?
76 Cf. the views expressed in the ECS Opinion at [25]–[26].
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Nevertheless, the Court’s novel approach in this regard implicitly suggests that
the CJEU was perhaps more comfortable in imposing liability on a hyperlinker only
when he is in possession of actual/constructive knowledge that the hyperlink in
question will ultimately direct users to unauthorised material on the target website.
If this were truly the Court’s intent,77 then it is submitted that the better way forward
– particularly given the various doctrinal difficulties canvassed above – is for the
courts to examine the potential copyright liability of hyperlinkers through the lens
of accessory/indirect liability instead.78 In other words, a hyperlinker ought to be
made liable (if at all) purely on the basis of his role as an accessory to the
unauthorised acts of the primary infringer (i.e. the owner of the target website).79
The accessory/indirect liability approach is preferable for a number of reasons.
First, unlike primary/direct liability which is strict, it focuses the inquiry squarely on
the hyperlinker’s state of mind and is therefore compatible with the reasoning of the
CJEU in GS Media. For example, a hyperlinker may well face an action for
authorising infringement (which is enshrined in English, Canadian, Australian and
Singaporean copyright law)80 because it has been persuasively argued that liability
by authorisation is composed of ‘‘a conduct element and a mental element’’.81
Although it is true that authorisation liability has generally been regarded in the
copyright statutes of many jurisdictions as falling within the ambit of primary
liability, it ‘‘clearly maps in substance to conventional forms of secondary or joint
tortfeasor liability’’.82
Second, by taking the accessory/indirect liability approach to examining a
hyperlinker’s potential liability in copyright, we can safely avoid the potential
drawbacks associated with the ‘‘new public’’ criterion espoused in Svensson,83
particularly in circumstances where the copyright owner has since withdrawn his
consent to material hosted on the target website which was freely available to the
public previously. A hyperlinker – who had posted links to such material prior to
77 Cf. the sentiments expressed by the CJEU in GS Media at [45].
78 This author has deliberately refrained from using the expression ‘‘secondary liability’’, preferring
instead ‘‘accessory/indirect liability’’ or liability which is derivative in nature. In certain jurisdictions,
‘‘secondary liability’’ may arise where the alleged defendant has commercially exploited infringing
copies of copyright material – conduct that is materially different from that undertaken by accessories or
indirect infringers.
79 For judicial and academic support of this proposition, see, e.g., TONO et al v Frank Allan Bruvik d/b/a
Napster [2006] 37 IIC p. 120 (Supreme Court of Norway); Stichting BREIN v Techno Design [2006]
ECDR p. 21 (Amsterdam Court of Appeal); Savola (2014) EIPR p. 279 at p. 288; Hornle (2014), p. 439 at
p. 443; Leistner (2017), p. 327 at p. 332; Midelieva (2017), p. 479 at p. 487; Bently and Sherman (2014),
pp. 169–170.
80 See Sec. 16(2) of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988; Secs. 3(1) and 27(1) of the
Canadian Copyright Act 1985; Sec. 36(1) of the Australian Copyright Act 1968; and Sec. 31(1) of the
Singapore Copyright Act 1987.
81 Arnold and Davies (2017), p. 442 at p. 462 (emphasis added). The authors also assert thus: ‘‘It seems
plain, however, that there must be a mental element: authorisation could hardly be a doctrine of strict
liability’’ (ibid., at p. 464). See, further, Saw CL and Chik WB, ‘‘Revisiting Authorisation Liability in
Copyright Law’’ (2012) 24 Singapore Academy of Law Journal p. 698 (especially at [39] et seq).
82 Dinwoodie (2017), Chapter 1, p. 6.
83 Cf. GS Media at [22] and [46], as well as supra note 20.
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the copyright owner’s revocation of consent – ought to be able to avoid a finding of
accessory/indirect liability where he can establish that he did not know and could
not reasonably have known that the relevant material is now available on the
internet without the consent of the copyright owner.
Finally, the accessory/indirect liability approach provides far greater certainty
and assurance to all hyperlinkers in the online community. In this author’s view, it
seems highly unjust to saddle them with the added responsibility of having to
monitor the legitimacy of the content to which the hyperlink leads, or be otherwise
subject to potential primary/direct liability. Conversely, where a hyperlinker has
received notification from the copyright owner that consent has since been
withdrawn (and a corresponding request to remove the link), he should, quite
rightly, be subject to copyright liability if he so chooses to ignore such notification.
3.2 Framing and Inline Linking
We turn our discussion now to other forms of linking on the internet, namely
framing and inline linking.84 Intuitively, the practical effects of framing and inline
linking – which are often automatically triggered – may signify that these online
practices (unlike hyperlinking) possibly lead to different legal consequences in
copyright law. It will be recalled that in framing, content from the target website is
retrieved by a user’s web browser and displayed on the linking website itself,
thereby giving the impression that the user is viewing content that is contained
within (and stored on) the linking website.85
On one view, framing and inline linking ought to constitute acts of communi-
cation (or making available) under the InfoSoc Directive because these online
practices (particularly where the user is not required to click on any visible link) do
provide users – much more overtly than does hyperlinking – with automatic and/or
more direct access to unauthorised material on the target website.86 It may also be
argued that the alleged defendant in such cases has somehow endorsed (or taken
responsibility for) the material drawn from the target website as such material has
now formed an integral part of the linking website.87 It is also true in such cases that
whilst the alleged defendant has no control whatsoever over the material hosted on
the target website, he does possess absolute control over whether his own website
ought to display such content in the first instance. Accordingly, it may be postulated
84 It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider whether framing and inline linking might be
objectionable under the laws of unfair competition and passing off, or whether they might otherwise
amount to a breach of a copyright owner’s moral rights.
85 See also Svensson at [29].
86 Cf. the views expressed by Deschamps J – in the context of the law of defamation in Canada – in
Crookes v Newton [2011] 3 SCR 269 at [96].
87 This was indeed the view taken by the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) in Die
Realitat I [2014] GRUR p. 818. See also the views of Sir Tim-Berners Lee in his ‘‘Commentary on Web
Architecture’’: ‘‘embedded objects, and background sounds and images are by default to be considered
part of the document…. The author of a document has responsibility for the content, even if the images
he or she includes are from another web site’’ (Berners-Lee (1997)).
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that framing and inline linking do fall within the natural and ordinary meaning of
the expression ‘‘making available’’.88
On the other hand, it is also possible to examine the acts of framing and inline
linking in a different light and to come to the view that they are not altogether
different from hyperlinking in substance. Whether the alleged defendant has created
a hyperlink on his website to unauthorised material on the target website or has
otherwise provided a frame (or embedded an element) within his own website that
displays infringing content from the target website, it is important to remember that:
1. the unauthorised material in question was already in existence on the internet,
having been uploaded or initially made available to the public by the owner of
the target website (i.e. the primary actor); and
2. from a technical point of view, it is the user’s web browser (or the user himself)
that interacts directly with the server hosting the unauthorised material on the
target website through the means supplied by the alleged defendant – whether it
be a hyperlink, framing or inline linking.89
Further, insofar as the existence of an ‘‘act of communication’’ is concerned, it
cannot be sensibly argued that the alleged defendant in a framing/inline linking
scenario had intervened in such a manner that users would otherwise not be able to
obtain access to unauthorised material on the target website but for the defendant’s
deliberate intervention. Much like in hyperlinking, the ‘‘but for’’ test proposed by
this author above – in preference to the ‘‘intervention to give access’’ test – would
not have been satisfied either on these facts. As mentioned, online users can still
obtain their own access to (pre-existing) unauthorised material by visiting the target
website directly, without having to rely at all on the defendant’s intervention
(whether by way of hyperlinking, framing or inline linking).
Finally, as regards the element of ‘‘control’’, the arguments to be made are also
not dissimilar. Whilst it is true that the alleged defendant who intervenes by way of
framing or inline linking has complete autonomy in determining the compositional
make-up of the linking website, it remains the case that he does not possess any
control whatsoever over the contents hosted on the target website (i.e. whether they
continue to remain available on the internet and in exactly the same form). As in the
88 See Page 1 of the ‘‘Executive Summary’’ of the ALAI Report and Resolution No. 5 of the AIPPI
Resolution. See also the Canadian Supreme Court’s obiter dicta in Society of Composers, Authors and
Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn of Internet Providers [2004] 2 SCR 427 at [102]: ‘‘Of
course an Internet Service Provider in Canada can play a number of roles. In addition to its function as an
intermediary, it may as well act as a content provider, or create embedded links which automatically
precipitate a telecommunication of copyrighted music from another source. In such cases, copyright
liability may attach to the added functions’’ (emphasis added). See, further, Leistner (2017), p. 327 at
pp. 329–330.
89 In hyperlinking, it is the user’s web browser that takes the user directly to the target website. In
framing and inline linking, the unauthorised material in question is electronically transmitted from the
target website directly to the user’s computer screen through the user’s web browser. See, further, Perfect
10 Inc v Google Inc 508 F.3d p. 1146 at p. 1161 (9th Cir. 2007): ‘‘HTML instructions do not themselves
cause infringing images to appear on the user’s computer screen. The HTML merely gives the address of
the image to the user’s browser. The browser then interacts with the computer that stores the infringing
image. It is this interaction that causes an infringing image to appear on the user’s computer screen’’.
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case of hyperlinking, framing and inline linking clearly facilitate a user’s access to –
but do not always make available – material on the target website.
Therefore, in substance, both framing and inline linking – despite the automatic
character of such links which differentiate them in form from hyperlinking – only
function as secondary points of access. They are no more than online tools that
greatly facilitate/enhance a user’s access to pre-existing material which he may
otherwise have had difficulty locating on the internet. For providing users with
indirect access, the alleged defendant in a framing/inline linking scenario ought to
assume (if at all) accessory/indirect liability only.90 He should therefore not be
regarded in law as a primary/direct infringer of copyright.91
Before leaving the issue of framing and inline linking, brief mention will be
made of the principle of technological neutrality. As is well known, upholding
technological neutrality is a fundamental tenet in the drafting, interpretation and
application of any law regulating electronic communications on the internet. This is
particularly pertinent in the context of the present discussion because framing and
inline linking on the one hand and hyperlinking on the other do, in substance,
perform the same function of ultimately connecting users with material found
elsewhere on the internet (even if the precise technical means employed to perform
this function differ). If it is true that the same regulatory principles should apply
regardless of the technology used, then it is submitted that framing and inline
linking – on the same basis as how hyperlinking ought to be regulated – should
likewise not attract primary/direct copyright liability. Instead, all forms of linking
on the internet should be examined through the lens of accessory/indirect liability
only (save for situations in which the ‘‘but for’’ test is satisfied on the facts).
This argument is also attractive from a policy perspective. If it is the case that
only some forms of linking on the internet can potentially give rise to primary/direct
liability (e.g. framing) but not others (e.g. surface linking),92 then it seems highly
unlikely that anyone in the shoes of a link-setter will be willing to assist the online
public further by facilitating even greater access to third-party material through the
use of deep links, framing and inline linking (surface links being less helpful by
nature) and then risk increased exposure to legal liability in the process.
Regrettably, internet users will find themselves caught between a rock and a hard
place. For our purposes, is this perplexing state of affairs not contrary to the general
public interest and detrimental to ‘‘the proper functioning and the very architecture
of the internet’’?93
90 See Strowel and Hanley (2009), pp. 83–84: where the authors argue, relying on the Tariff 22 case
before the Copyright Board of Canada ((1999) 1 CPR (4th) 417 (27 October 1999)), that ‘‘some form of
‘authorization’ [or ‘endorsement’] is arguably involved in the case of embedded links, which results in the
possibility of holding the provider of an automatic link as indirectly liable for copyright infringement
under Canadian law (and under other laws based on the UK-originated concept of ‘authorization’)’’
(emphasis added). See, further, the decision of the US Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Perfect 10
Inc v Google Inc 508 F.3d p. 1146 at p. 1161 (9th Cir. 2007).
91 This view is consistent with the position adopted in the ECS Opinion. See, in particular, [53]: ‘‘In
principle, we are unable to see why ‘framing’ as it is often called, should be treated any differently for
copyright purposes from hyperlinking’’.
92 Cf., in this regard, the views adopted in the ALAI Report and AIPPI Resolution.
93 Per AG Wathelet in GS Media (Opinion) at [78]. Cf. also Midelieva (2017), p. 479 at pp. 485–486.
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4 Lessons from Elsewhere
It may be helpful to briefly examine how other jurisdictions deal with the potential
copyright liability of online users who engage in hyperlinking, framing and/or inline
linking.
In England, for example, the question has arisen in the context of applications for
website-blocking orders under Sec. 97A of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988 (which implemented Art. 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive). On facts akin to
inline linking (where an embedded player on the linking website provided internet
users with access to the unauthorised streaming of copyright films and TV
programmes hosted on third-party websites), Arnold J in the English High Court
expressed the view that ‘‘the mere provision of a hyperlink is [arguably] not enough
to constitute communication to the public (particularly if the hyperlink is not
directly to a source of the copyright work)’’.94 His Lordship further opined that it
would arguably make ‘‘no difference whether clicking on the links results in
framing (i.e. the work being presented within the frame of the operator’s website) or
not’’.95
Ultimately, Arnold J adopted the following test for liability – i.e. whether the
alleged infringers had intervened in such a ‘‘highly material way’’ as to make the
copyright works in question available to the public.96 It was found on the facts that
this test had been satisfied.97 Even though the alleged infringers did not themselves
host or make available the infringing content (but had merely provided users with
access to such content hosted elsewhere), they did, however, provide search
facilities to enable users to identify their preferred films and/or TV programmes, as
well as index, aggregate, reference, moderate and/or otherwise provide editorial
oversight for the infringing content.98 In short, they were primary actors/infringers
in their own right. Bearing in mind that the English courts are, at present, required to
pay deference to CJEU case law, it is this author’s opinion that Arnold J’s test –
where the defendant must have intervened in a ‘‘highly material way’’ – is, in
substance, not incompatible with the test set out by the CJEU in GS Media for
determining when an ‘‘act of communication’’ may arise (and, in particular, with the
specific example raised by the Court therein).99
More pertinently, even if Arnold J were wrong in his conclusion that the alleged
infringers were primarily liable in copyright for the breach of the right of
94 Paramount Home Entertainment International Ltd & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors
(‘‘Paramount v BSkyB’’) [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch) at [32] and [37]. Cf. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp
v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) at [125] (per Kitchin J).
95 Paramount v BSkyB at [32].
96 Ibid. Similar cases decided by Arnold J include EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd
[2013] EWHC 379 (Ch) and Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd
[2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch).
97 Paramount v BSkyB at [34].
98 Ibid., at [5]. For a similar case, see Paramount Home Entertainment International Ltd & Ors v British
Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2014] EWHC 937 (Ch) (before Henderson J).
99 See GS Media at [35] and also the text accompanying supra note 46. It will be recalled that the specific
example supplied by the CJEU in [35] mirrors the ‘‘but for’’ test proposed by this author above.
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communication to the public, his Lordship was nevertheless prepared to hold them
liable for authorising infringement as well as on the basis of joint tortfeasorship.
Over in Dublin, the Copyright Review Committee, in its report titled
‘‘Modernising Copyright’’,100 came to the view that ‘‘links simply convey that
something exists; but they do not, by themselves, publish, reproduce or commu-
nicate its content’’.101 The report, however, goes on to suggest that a hyperlinker
may be exposed to copyright liability where ‘‘the provider of the link, at the time
that he or she provided it, knew or ought to have been aware that it connects with an
infringing copy, unless the provision of the link is in the public interest’’.102
Although the report stops short of identifying precisely whether such liability is
primary/direct or indirect/derivative in nature, this author is of the view, on reading
the report as a whole, that the Committee had accessory/indirect liability in mind
because of the relevance of the hyperlinker’s knowledge or state of mind.
A similar view has been taken in Australia. In Cooper v Universal Music
Australia Pty Ltd,103 the defendant created and operated the website ‘‘mp3s4free.-
net’’ which allowed internet users – via hyperlinks – to illegitimately access and
download music files for free from third-party websites. After considering all the
factors in Sec. 101(1A) of the Australian Copyright Act 1968,104 the Full Federal
Court held that the defendant was liable for authorising infringements of copyright.
It was clear on the facts that the ‘‘mp3s4free.net’’ website, on which these
hyperlinks were found, had been deliberately designed to facilitate unauthorised
access by internet users to copyright material located elsewhere. Crucially, the
Court in this case did not hold the defendant liable as a primary/direct infringer of
copyright but instead found him liable on the basis of authorisation liability (i.e.
accessory/indirect liability).
Turning to the United States, a similar trend is discernible. The act of
hyperlinking in this jurisdiction does not give rise to claims for primary/direct
infringement.105 Instead, a hyperlinker may be found liable for contributory
infringement because he is the party ‘‘who, with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another’’.106 Notably, other forms of accessory/indirect liability in the US include
vicarious liability and inducement liability.107
100 Report of the Copyright Review Committee (2013).
101 Ibid., at p. 53.
102 Ibid. (emphasis added).
103 (2006) 237 ALR p. 714; [2006] FCAFC 187 (Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia).
104 Act No. 63 of 1968 (Cth).
105 See, e.g., Ticketmaster Corp v Tickets.Com Inc 54 USPQ2d p. 1344 (CD Cal. 2000). However,
hyperlinking to protected content via the circumvention of technological protection measures (such as
encryption) may instead amount to a violation of the DMCA: see 17 USC §1201 and Universal City
Studios Inc v Reimerdes 111 F Supp.2d p. 294 (SDNY 2000).
106 Gershwin Publishing Corp v Columbia Artists Management Inc 443 F.2d p. 1159 at p. 1162 (2nd Cir.
1971). See also Intellectual Reserve Inc v Utah Lighthouse Ministry Inc 75 F Supp.2d p. 1290 (D Utah
1999); Pearson Educ Inc v Ishayev 963 F Supp.2d p. 239 (SDNY 2013).
107 See, e.g., MGM Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd 545 US p. 913 (2005).
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As regards framing and inline linking specifically, these online practices
similarly do not give rise to primary/direct liability – for the breach of a copyright
owner’s ‘‘display right’’ pursuant to 17 USC §101 – because American courts take
the view that no copy has been made of the copyright work (e.g. an image) and
stored on the linking website.108 As explained by the US Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit: ‘‘Google [the defendant] may facilitate the user’s access to infringing
images. However, such assistance raises only contributory liability issues, and does
not constitute direct infringement of the copyright owner’s display rights’’.109
Clearly, a round-up of the foregoing discussion reveals that the weight of judicial
opinion generally lies in favour of treating such forms of online activity –
hyperlinking, framing and inline linking – as giving rise, in appropriate circum-
stances, to accessory/indirect liability only.
5 Having Regard to the Law of Defamation
Interestingly, valuable comparisons may be drawn with the concept of ‘‘publica-
tion’’ in the law of defamation to which our discussion seemingly digresses at this
juncture. An important ingredient of the tort of defamation concerns the publication
by the defendant of defamatory material relating to the plaintiff to a third party.
Generally speaking, publication occurs when a person, intentionally or negligently,
takes part in or authorises the communication of defamatory material to a third
party.110 In other words, one crucial aspect of publication involves the making
available of defamatory material by the defendant to a third party.111
In England, the common law would likely treat hyperlinkers – whose links lead
internet users to defamatory material – as publishers of such material where it can
be established that they have ‘‘a degree of awareness or at least an assumption of
general responsibility’’ for the material.112 More generally, for the defendant to be
held liable as a publisher, there must be ‘‘knowing involvement in the process of
publication’’113 or he must have ‘‘knowingly participated’’ in the publication of
108 See, e.g., Perfect 10 Inc v Google Inc 508 F.3d p. 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Flava Works Inc v Gunter 689
F.3d p. 754 (7th Cir. 2012).
109 Perfect 10 Inc v Google Inc 508 F.3d p. 1146 at p. 1161 (9th Cir. 2007).
110 Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR p. 331 at pp. 363–366 (High Court of Australia).
111 In Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR p. 575, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow
and Hayne JJ opined thus (at [26]): ‘‘it would be wrong to treat publication as if it were a unilateral act on
the part of the publisher alone. It is not. It is a bilateral act – in which the publisher makes it available and
a third party has it available for his or her comprehension’’ (emphasis added). See also Deschamps J’s
speech in Crookes v Newton [2011] 3 SCR 269 at [55]: in the common law of defamation, ‘‘publication
has two components: (1) an act that makes the defamatory information available to a third party in a
comprehensible form, and (2) the receipt of the information by a third party in such a way that it is
understood’’ (emphasis added).
112 Bunt v Tilley [2006] EWHC 407 (QB); [2006] 3 All ER 336 (QB) at [22] (per Eady J). See also
Collins (2014), p. 101. It appears that the common law position in Australia is similar: see Duffy v Google
Inc [2015] SASC 170 (per Blue J) and Visscher v Maritime Union of Australia (No 6) [2014] NSWSC 350
at [29] (per Beech-Jones J).
113 Bunt v Tilley [2006] EWHC 407 (QB); [2006] 3 All ER 336 (QB) at [23].
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defamatory material.114 It does not suffice if the defendant ‘‘merely plays a passive
instrumental role in the process’’.115
Be that as it may, it is noteworthy that these common law principles of
publication have since been altered by Sec. 10(1) of the UK Defamation Act 2013.
According to this provision, in respect of causes of action accruing after 1 January
2014, the English courts do not have jurisdiction to hear and determine defamation
actions brought against persons who are not an ‘‘author’’, ‘‘editor’’ or ‘‘publisher’’ of
the statement complained of – as these terms are defined in Sec. 1 of the UK
Defamation Act 1996 – ‘‘unless the court is satisfied that it is not reasonably
practicable for an action to be brought against the author, editor or publisher’’. For
Sec. 10 purposes, a ‘‘publisher’’ means ‘‘a commercial publisher, that is, a person
whose business is issuing material to the public, or a section of the public, who
issues material containing the statement in the course of that business’’.116
Insofar as the concept of ‘‘publication’’ under the current law of defamation in
England is concerned, a leading commentator on the subject has expressed the
following view in relation to linking on the internet:
The authors of defamatory online content will be treated as the publishers of
any additional publications resulting from people following hyperlinks to that
content provided by third parties. Internet users who follow ordinary
hyperlinks are transported to the original author’s content. That content is
then published to them, in the form intended by the original author. …
Properly understood, ordinary linking cases do not involve the repetition or
republication of material: the link is merely the route by which the internet
user comes to visit the content in the first place.117
It was further argued that ‘‘[a]lthough the technology is more complicated, the
same position is likely to obtain in relation to framed content’’.118
Prima facie, anyone who engages in hyperlinking, framing and/or inline linking
appears to be shielded from defamation liability under English law at present
because it seems rather implausible that a link-setter can ordinarily be said to fall
within the statutory definition of a ‘‘publisher’’. Instead, claimants in the UK must,
in the first instance, commence action against the ‘‘author’’, ‘‘editor’’ or ‘‘publisher’’
of the statement complained of. An English court can no longer hear a defamation
claim against a secondary party unless the court is satisfied that it is not reasonably
practicable for the claimant to proceed against the primary tortfeasor.
The legal position in Canada as regards tortious liability for hyperlinking to
defamatory content has been authoritatively established by the decision of the
114 Ibid., at [36].
115 Ibid., at [23]. See also Tamiz v Google Inc [2013] 1 WLR p. 2151; Oriental Press Group Ltd v
Fevaworks Solutions Ltd [2014] EMLR p. 11.
116 See Sec. 10(2) of the UK Defamation Act 2013 and Sec. 1(2) of the UK Defamation Act 1996.
117 Collins (2014), p. 103 (emphasis added).
118 Ibid.
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Canadian Supreme Court in Crookes v Newton.119 In this particular case, it was
alleged that one of the articles posted on a website operated by the defendant
provided surface and deep links to third-party websites which contained defamatory
information about the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued on the basis that two of these
hyperlinks provided by the defendant had directed online users to defamatory
material about the plaintiff and therefore the defendant should be taken to have
published the defamatory information in question. Put simply, the issue before the
Court was whether hyperlinking, in and of itself, amounted to ‘‘publication’’ for the
purposes of the law of defamation in Canada.120
As mentioned, an important feature of the concept of ‘‘publication’’ concerns the
making available of defamatory information by the defendant to a third party.121 In
the majority judgment delivered by Abella J (with whom Binnie, LeBel, Charron,
Rothstein and Cromwell JJ agreed), her Honour expressed it thus: ‘‘To succeed in an
action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove on a balance of probabilities that the
defamatory words were published, that is, that they were ‘communicated to at least
one person other than the plaintiff’’’.122
Framed in this way, it is submitted that the legal issue under consideration in
Crookes (that of hyperlinking and ‘‘publication’’ in the law of defamation) is not, in
substance, dissimilar to the principal issue under consideration in this paper (that of
hyperlinking and ‘‘making available’’ in the copyright context).
Pertinently, Abella J was quick to point out the similarities between hyperlinks
and references,123 saying that ‘‘[b]oth communicate that something exists [and
where it exists], but do not, by themselves, communicate its content [to the
user]’’.124 Furthermore, hyperlinks and references are, by nature, content-neutral:
119 Crookes v Newton [2011] 3 SCR 269. Although the outcome of the appeal was unanimous amongst
all nine Supreme Court justices, six judges adopted the same reasoning and analysis (in the judgment
delivered by Abella J), two judges substantially agreed with the reasoning of the majority (see the joint
judgment of McLachlin CJ and Fish J), while Deschamps J delivered a sole-authored judgment based on a
different set of reasoning and analysis.
120 It is important to bear in mind that this judgment did not concern (and therefore did not address the
legal implications of) other forms of linking on the internet, such as framing and inline linking: see
Crookes v Newton [2011] 3 SCR 269 at [43] and [52].
121 Ibid., at [16] and [55].
122 Ibid., at [1] (emphasis added; citation omitted).
123 Ibid., at [27] (‘‘Hyperlinks are, in essence, references’’). For a contrary view, see Deschamps J’s
judgment at [96]. With respect, however, this author takes issue with Deschamps J’s criticism of the
footnote analogy as being overly formalistic in nature and too focused on differences in form/
technicalities (rather than substance). The learned judge’s purported distinction between how a footnote
operates in the analogue world and how a hyperlink functions in the online environment is, with respect,
far too pedantic.
124 Ibid., at [30] (and see also [26]). Cf., further, the ECS Opinion at [6] and [40] et seq. Notably, courts
in the US have also followed this line of reasoning, i.e. a hyperlink (like a mere reference) does not
constitute a re-publication of the defamatory material in question: see Salyer v S Poverty Law Center Inc
701 F Supp.2d p. 912 at pp. 916–917 (WD Ky 2009); In re Philadelphia Newspapers LLC 690 F.3d p. 161
at pp. 173–175 (3rd Cir 2012); US ex rel Klein v Omeros Corp 897 F Supp.2d p. 1058 at p. 1074 (WD
Wash 2012); Life Designs Ranch Inc v Michael Sommer, No 32922-4 (Court of Appeals of the State of
Washington, Division III, 12 November 2015).
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they express no opinion,125 nor do they have any control over the contents to which
they refer.126 Her Honour also perceptively observed that a hyperlinker’s
participation ‘‘is merely ancillary to that of the initial publisher: with or without
the [hyperlink], the allegedly defamatory information has already been made
available to the public by the initial publisher or publishers’ acts’’.127
In the end, Abella J and five of her other colleagues were unwavering in their
view that ‘‘[m]aking reference to the existence and/or location of content by
hyperlink or otherwise, without more, is not publication of that content’’.128 Indeed,
‘‘[i]f a plaintiff wishes to prevent further publications of the defamatory content, his
or her most effective remedy lies with the person who actually created and controls
the content’’.129
This author is in complete agreement with the views expressed in Abella J’s
illuminating judgment. There is, it is submitted, no basis at all on which the law can
make a rational distinction between the potential liability of a defendant who
supplies hyperlinks to defamatory content and one whose hyperlinks direct users to
copyright-infringing material. In both scenarios, and for largely the same reasons,
the hyperlinks operate as mere references that simply inform users of the existence
of online material located elsewhere on the internet. These ‘‘location tools’’ do not,
by themselves, communicate (or make available) the material in question to the end
user. For the purposes of defamation law and copyright law, a hyperlinker’s
intervention in the online environment should be regarded as being purely ancillary
to that of the initial publisher of defamatory content and the initial uploader of
infringing material (on whom primary/direct liability ought to be imposed).
Admittedly, the values enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms – in particular, the public’s interest in protecting freedom of expression –
did underpin Abella J’s reasoning and analysis in this case concerning the law of
defamation.130 Nevertheless, even though the objectives sought to be achieved
through a healthy and vibrant IP ecosystem are not identical to those in the
Canadian Charter, it is abundantly clear in IP that the law’s ultimate objective is to
strike the right balance between protecting the intangible, proprietary rights of the
individual creator on the one hand and the public interest in maintaining freedom of
information, communication and expression on the other.131 It is therefore
submitted that the various policy perspectives adopted in Abella J’s judgment
(and associated legal reasoning) ought to apply with equal force in the copyright
context as well.132 Accordingly, there is no reason why the law of copyright as
regards potential liability for hyperlinking should not also evolve in tandem with
current developments in the law of defamation – both in England and Canada.
125 Note, however, Abella J’s caveat in Crookes v Newton [2011] 3 SCR 269 at [40].
126 Ibid., at [26].
127 Ibid., at [26] (emphasis added).
128 Ibid., at [42].
129 Ibid., at [41].
130 Ibid., at [33].
131 See, e.g., GS Media at [31] and [45].
132 For example, see Crookes v Newton [2011] 3 SCR 269 at [36].
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6 Conclusion
Svensson and GS Media were no doubt watershed judgments of the CJEU. Because
they expose several doctrinal inconsistencies and consequently the Court’s strained
reasoning, they have also engendered much academic debate and legal uncertainty.
One commentator has sought to rationalise both decisions by arguing that they
were, in effect, valiant attempts at establishing ‘‘harmonized norms of liability for
facilitation of infringement that result in the direct liability of the facilitator for
violation of the right of communication to the public’’.133 It was also suggested that
this movement by the CJEU towards a European harmonisation of the law on
accessory/indirect liability is due, in no small part, to the ‘‘‘very divergent solutions’
to the doctrine of derivative liability adopted by different EU member states’’.134
Given this lack of a pan-European framework for accessory/indirect liability, we
can now better appreciate why the CJEU, insofar as a hyperlinker’s potential
liability in copyright is concerned, had to bend over backwards on various occasions
in order to fit what is essentially a square peg135 into a ‘‘hexagonal hole’’.136 As a
consequence and as the discourse in this paper has clearly shown, EU copyright law
– particularly in relation to the (harmonised) right of communication to the public –
has become further mired in doctrinal chaos. The following examples provide a
snapshot of some of the issues that currently plague the law in this area:
1. the unambiguous holding in Svensson that the mere ‘‘provision of clickable
links to protected works must be considered to be ‘making available’ and,
therefore, an ‘act of communication’’’;137
2. a broadly defined ‘‘intervention to give access’’ test for determining when an act
of communication (or making available) may be established (in light of
Svensson but not satisfactorily resolved in GS Media);
3. the problematic ‘‘new public’’ criterion (perpetuated in Svensson and its
progeny);
4. a new judicially created ‘‘notice and takedown’’ regime – parked under the head
of primary/direct liability – regulating not-for-profit hyperlinking scenarios
(because of the relevance of a hyperlinker’s state of mind and courtesy of GS
Media);138
5. an unfortunate conflation of copyright theories concerning primary/direct
liability on the one hand and accessory/indirect liability on the other (courtesy
of GS Media).
133 Ginsburg J (2017), p. 7 (emphasis added).
134 Ibid.
135 That is, the imposition of primary/direct liability which is harmonised under the InfoSoc Directive.
136 To borrow the analogy from Crookes v Newton [2011] 3 SCR 269 at [36]. See also Clark and
Dickenson (2017), p. 265 at p. 277: ‘‘right holders are forced to try to stretch existing primary liability law
to cover circumstances such as these, with the result that the CJEU is in turn required to employ ever
more strained reasoning’’.
137 Svensson at [20] (emphasis added).
138 See supra note 51.
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To address some of these legal woes, there are now pressing calls from copyright
scholars for legislative intervention and, in particular, legislative reform of Art. 3 of
the InfoSoc Directive.139
Notably, many jurisdictions have already developed a robust set of laws
governing accessory/indirect liability – for example, in the law of copyright, the
action for authorising infringement (as established in England, Canada, Australia
and Singapore) as well as that for contributory infringement (as established in the
US), to name just two. If the EU experience at present is anything to go by and if
any lessons at all can be gleaned from how the concept of ‘‘publication’’ has been
interpreted (and has indeed evolved) in the law of defamation (particularly in
Canada), it is submitted that in all these jurisdictions, the act of linking to
unauthorised material on third-party websites should not, as a matter of principle,
attract primary/direct copyright liability (save for situations in which the ‘‘but for’’
test is satisfied on the facts).140 For the sake of doctrinal clarity, and with the
ultimate aim in mind of injecting greater certainty into the law and of restoring
confidence in all members of the online community, it is hoped that this paper has
sounded the clarion call for the law of copyright (in the EU and elsewhere) to
decisively treat all forms of linking on the internet – on appropriate facts – as giving
rise only to accessory/indirect liability.
Otherwise, as Abella J has perceptively cautioned, an unthinking and strict
application of legal liability rules ‘‘would be like trying to fit a square archaic peg
into the hexagonal hole of modernity’’.141 Given the central role that links play in
the present-day context of the internet, ‘‘we risk impairing its whole function-
ing’’.142 Surely, this eventuality must be avoided at all cost.
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